We investigate security properties of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld commutator key-establishment protocol [1] used with certain polycyclic groups described by Eick and Kahrobaei [3] . We show that despite low success of the length based attack shown by Garber, Kahrobaei and Lam [5] the protocol can be broken by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze the commutator key-establishment protocol [1] used with certain polycyclic groups described in [3] . The commutator key-establishment (CKE) protocol is a two-party protocol performed as follows.
• Fix a group (called the platform group) and a set of generators 1 , . . . , for . All this information is made public.
• Alice prepares a tuple of elements = ( 1 , . . . ,
1
) called Alice's public tuple. Each is generated randomly as a product of 's and their inverses.
• Bob prepares a tuple of elements = ( 1 , . . . ,
2
) called Bob's public tuple. Each is generated randomly as a product of 's and their inverses.
• Alice generates a random element as a product 1 1 . . .
of 's and their inverses. The element (or more precisely its factorization) is called Alice's private element.
• Bob generates a random element as a product ).
• Finally, Alice computes the element as a product:
using the elements of Bob's conjugate tuple .
• Bob computes the key as a product:
. . . in . The obtained commutator is the shared key. Security of the commutator key establishment protocol is based on computational hardness of computing the commutator [ , ] based on the intercepted public information -the tuples , and their conjugates = ὔ and = ὔ satisfying:
In general it can happen that ὔ ̸ = as explained in [10] , but as practice shows very often = ὔ (for instance, as in [6] ).
A big advantage of the commutator key-establishment protocol over other group-based protocols is that it can be used with any group satisfying certain computational properties. Originally, the group of braids was suggested to be used as a platform group, but after a series of attacks it became clear that can not provide good security. But the search for a good group is still very active and in [3] a certain class of polycyclic groups was proposed to be used with CKE. In this paper we show that this class can not provide good security. For more on group-based cryptography see [9] .
Outline. In Section 2 we de ne the class of groups under investigation and discuss two di erent ways to represent the elements. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe the attacks on di erent group presentations.
The platform group
Consider an irreducible monic polynomial ( ) ∈ ℤ[ ] and de ne a eld A semidirect product ⋉ O of and O is de ned as a Cartesian product × O equipped with the following binary operation:
( , ) ⋅ ( , ) = ( , + ).
The constructed group is the platform group in [3] . It is easy to see that is polycyclic and metabelian and there are several di erent ways to represent . (a) One can work with as it is de ned above, i.e., as a semidirect product, in which case its elements are represented as pairs and multiplication (1) is used. (b) One can construct a polycyclic presentation for and work with its elements as with words over the generating set. Unfortunately, neither [3] nor [5] give any detail on how to treat . Since computational properties of the same group can vary depending on a way we represent its elements, in the next sections we discuss both presentations of .
. as a set of pairs of matrices
There are di erent ways to represent the elements of . For instance, elements in can be represented as polynomials over ℚ of degree up to − 1 with addition and multiplication performed modulo the original polynomial . Also one can represent elements in by matrices as described below. Recall that the companion matrix for a monic polynomial =
Denote by the identity matrix. The characteristic and minimal polynomial of is and the set of matrices
equipped with the usual matrix addition and multiplication is a eld. The correspondence between two presentations is obvious:
Choosing a particular presentation, we do not change computational properties of . Here we choose the matrix presentation for . Let 1 , . . . , be a basis of the ring of integers O , where each is a matrix. Hence
Let { 1 , . . . , } be a generating set for the group , where every is a matrix. Hence
By the Dirichlet theorem [7, Chapter 8], we have ≅ ℤ × ℤ −1 , where = + − 1, is the number of real eld monomorphisms → ℝ, and 2 is the number of complex eld monomorphisms → ℂ. Without loss of generality it can be assumed that 1 = .
Now naturally the group = ⋉ O is a set of pairs of matrices: It is easy to check that the inverse in ⋉ O can be computed as
which gives the following expression for the conjugate of ( , ) by ( , ):
.
given by polycyclic presentation
Recall that a group is called polycyclic if there exists a subnormal series of :
with cyclic factors −1 / . Denote [ −1 : ] by and put = { | < ∞}. Relative to the series above one can nd a generating set 1 , . . . , for satisfying ⟨ , ⟩ = −1 . Every element ∈ can be uniquely expressed as a product = 1 1 . . . , where ∈ ℤ, = 1, . . . , , and 0 ≤ < if ∈ . The polycyclic group has a nite presentation of the form = ⟨ 1 , . . . , | = ,
where , , and are words in +1 , . . . , . This presentation is called a polycyclic presentation. For more details see [7, Chapter 8] .
It is straightforward to nd a polycyclic presentation for the group = ⋉ O . It has generators 1 , . . . , , +1 , . . . , + , where 1 , . . . , correspond to the pairs ( 1 , ) , . . . , ( , ) ∈ ⋉ O ( is the zero matrix), and +1 , . . . , + correspond to the pairs ( , 1 ), . . . , ( , ) ∈ ⋉ O . The set of relations for is formed as follows.
. . , , = 1, . . . , , and 1 , . . . , are the coe cients in the expression = 1 1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ,
. . , , = 1, . . . , , and 1 , . . . , are the coe cients in the expression
Attack on semidirect product
In this section we assume that the group is given as a semidirect product and the eld is described using matrices as in (2). The general idea behind the attack is to extend the group and work in * = * ⋉ . The group * is, in general, not nitely generated and hence is not polycyclic. Nevertheless, the elements of * can be e ectively represented by pairs of matrices as described in Section 2.1. Consider a system of conjugacy equations related to Alice's private key:
with unknown ∈ ⋉ O . We treat the system as a system over * ⋉ , and hence
Using (3), we get the following system of 2 linear equations over the eld with two unknowns and :
It has a unique solution when the coe cient matrix of the system has rank 2 over the eld , in which case the obtained solution ὔ is the same as the original private key of Alice. We call the described approach " eld based attack" or simply FBA. The described attack was implemented in GAP [4] . Its implementation can be found in [8] . Table 1 compares success rate and time e ciency of our attack and the attack in [5] . Our tests were run on an Intel Core i5 1.80GHz computer with 4GB of RAM, Ubuntu 12.04, GAP 4.7.
The rst four columns of Table 1 are taken from [5] . For our tests we used the same parameter values: 
Attack on polycyclic presentation
In this section we assume that is given by a polycyclic presentation described in Section 2.2. First we show that the group can be presented as a semidirect product of an abelian matrix group and ℤ . Then we present the attack on the obtained presentation.
. Deduced semidirect product for
Given a polycyclic presentation for constructed in Section 2.2 it is straightforward to nd the numbers and . We also claim that given a pair ( , ) it requires polynomial time to nd a word such that ( ) = ( , ). To convert ( , ) into a word in the generators 1 , . . . , + one can express ( , ) as a product:
for some 1 , . . . , + ∈ ℤ, in which case = + . Clearly ( , ) = ( , 0)( , ). Therefore we have to solve two tasks. First, we need to nd 1 , . . . , such that = 1 1 . . . which can be done in polynomial time [2] . Second, we need to nd +1 , . . . , + such that = +1 1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + which is obvious.
It follows from the discussion above that computational problems for given by polycyclic presentation and by the deduced semidirect product are polynomial-time equivalent. Another important property of the computed presentation is that the ring generated by matrices 1 , . . . , is actually a eld isomorphic to a sub eld of (because 's de ne the same action as 's, but in a basis 1 , . . . , ).
. The attack
In the deduced presentation of the system of conjugacy equations (4) is equivalent to the following system of equations with unknown ∈ * and ∈ ℤ :
where ( , ) represents , ( , ) represents , ( , ὔ ) represents ὔ for = 1, . . . , 2 .
To solve system (5) we compute a basis 1 , . . . , of the eld as a vector space over ℚ. Hence which is a system of linear equations over eld ℚ with unknown = ( 1 , . . . , ) and 1 , . . . , ∈ ℚ. The solution of this system provides us with the key ὔ .
We call this procedure FBA2. The attack was also implemented in GAP and tested on the same machine. Table 2 contains the results of our tests.
Conclusion
Our arguments show the following.
• The groups of the form ⋉ O can not be used as platform groups in the commutator key-establishment protocol.
• It is di cult to devise a successful length-based attack, and a low success rate does not mean much in terms of security. Finally, we want to point out that our attack does not eliminate all polycyclic groups from consideration.
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